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RISK REGULATION AND ITS HAZARDS
Stephen F. Williams*
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEcIvE RISK
REGULATION. By Stephen Breyer. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 1993. Pp. x, 127. $22.95.
A seasoned Breyer-watcher once said, "Steve thinks the solu-
tion to most problems is to turn them over to a room full of people
as smart as he is."' The remark captures both the strength and
weakness of Justice Breyer's 1992 Holmes Lectures, now published
as Breaking the Vicious Circle. Breyer discusses key anomalies in
our current system for regulating environmental risks, seeks out
their causes, and proposes a remedy. The first phase, the discussion
of the inconsistencies in our current approach to environmental
regulation, is a tour de force, confidently integrating science and
policy in terms easily accessible to the intelligent layman. The sec-
ond, the explanation of why the incongruities prevail, is also very
skilled, though impaired - I will argue - by its almost complete
neglect of the role of interest group politics. The third, Breyer's
suggested solution, raises more serious problems. He proposes es-
tablishing not just a room full of intelligent people, but a whole
staff, located in the Office of Management and Budget, charged
with nudging the relevant agencies toward policies that are consis-
tent with each other and with economic rationality. A president
who pursued the proposed remedy would doubtless seek people
with the qualities so well reflected in this book - versatility, even-
handedness, balance, and intelligence. Assembling such a staff
would not be easy; people with these skills are in high demand and
short supply. Even assuming their assembly, however, Breyer does
not completely convince the reader that they could do the job. Can
a SWAT team of technocrats, however brilliant, neutralize the in-
terest groups at play in this field?
Breyer sees current policy as bringing about a wasteful misallo-
cation of resources - massive overinvestment in reducing some
risks and comparative neglect of others. "Tunnel vision," he argues,
leads agencies to pursue their missions without regard to competing
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.A. 1958,
Yale; J.D. 1961, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Name withheld to protect the guilty.
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values, a quest resulting in the attempt to eliminate "the last ten per
cent" of a problem even where the benefits are minimal in relation
to the costs (p. 11). In a Superfund case in Breyer's former court,2
the Environmental Protection Agency tried to compel a private
party to spend $9.3 million on additional cleanup of a waste site, so
that children could eat its dirt without ill effect not merely for 70
days a year -- the level the party, amazinglyagreed to achieve -
but for 245 days a year (pp. 11-12). As there were no children in
the vicinity, nor even residences, nor even any likelihood of oresi-
dential development, and as at least half the offending chemicals
would dissipate by the year 2000, the health return on this $9.3 mil-
lion clean up cost would have been meager.3
Nor does the dirt-eating-children episode appear atypical.
Breyer points to "mid-range" consensus estimates that the removal
of asbestos from schools would cost approximately $250 million per
statistical life saved (pp. 12-13). He cites the Fifth Circuit's obser-
vation 4 that the EPA's bans on a wide range of asbestos uses, had
they been allowed to take effect, would have cost approximately
$200 million by the EPA's own estimate while saving only about
seven or eight lives over the next thirteen years - less than half the
expected deaths from ingested toothpicks (p. 14). Further, some of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's benzene rules
will evidently cost about $180 million per statistical life saved (p.
15). Breyer includes a table listing regulations by cost per life pur-
portedly saved, including twenty-one regulations with costs over
$10 million and one with costs reaching $5.7 trillion.5 The pursuit of
completely pure air, land, and water clearly takes one to a point at
which the marginal cost of extra health may daunt all but the most
zealous.
Breyer argues that the related problems of random agenda se-
lection and inconsistency compound tunnel vision (pp. 19-28). Not
only do experts' assessments of the most serious risks differ radi-
cally from the popular understanding, but the government makes
no effort to establish overall priorities or to coordinate agency ef-
forts (pp. 19-20). The agencies use different methods to calculate
and evaluate health effects, and they ignore the ways in which one
2. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
3. Speaking through then-Judge Breyer, the First Circuit upheld the District Court's con-
clusion that the statutory standard - "the public interest and the equities of the case" - did
not require the extra $9.3 million. 900 F.2d at 441.
The EPA continues to protect children who might eat the ground daily for years at a time
in places in which they rarely set foot, such as highway median strips, roadside cemeteries,
golf courses, and industrial parks. See Leather Industries of America v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392,
404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
4. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1223 & n.23 (5th Cir. 1991).
5. Pp. 24-27. As $5.7 trillion is nearly a year's GNP, we may safely infer that the regula-
tion purported to save only a small fraction of a statistical life.
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set of regulations affects the fulfillment of other environmental
goals. For example, Breyer notes that when the EPA proposed
rules to reduce sewage sludge it claimed they would save one life
every five years, but it overlooked the rules' impact on waste incin-
eration: the resulting increases in this form of disposal would have
cost two statistical lives every year - ten times the expected bene-
fit of the sludge reduction (p. 22). Agencies similarly overlook the
offsetting behavior of individuals. A farmer deprived of a relatively
low-fisk artificial pesticide, for example, may substitute plants with
natural pesticides of equal or greater carcinogenicity. 6 At the very
least, one might hope for reform that would force the government
to coordinate its interventions. With some regulations costing bil-
lions but yielding almost no health gain, and with neglected oppor-
tunities at hand for saving lives at modest cost,7 the potential gains
from rationalization - shifting social investments to the most
promising health and safety opportunities - seem huge.8
Breyer attributes the persistence of wasteful regulation to three
causes: inaccurate public perceptions, congressional action and re-
action, and uncertainties in the regulatory process. Though believ-
ing that people think rationally in assessing risks and possible
remedies, Breyer argues that most people are unlikely to acquire a
full grasp of the relevant facts. If people "think dramatically, not
quantitatively," for instance, as Justice Holmes observed,9 they are
6. P. 23. Plants resist the menace of pests with natural pesticides, many of which appear
to be far more potent than artificial - and therefore regulated - chemicals. P. 98 n.117
(citing Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 ScmNcE 271,276-
77 (1987)).
Dr. Lois Swirsky Gold and others have created a "human exposure/rodent potency in-
dex" or HERP, to relate various natural and artificial substances to each other by using
conventional linear extrapolation from rodent tests. See infra note 10 and accompanying text
for discussion of issues of linear extrapolation. The HERP for each substance is a ratio, of
which the denominator is the substance's TD50 - daily lifetime dose rate estimated to halve
the proportion of tumor-free rodents by the end of a standard lifetime - and the numerator
is a dose that might reasonably be taken daily by humans, adjusted for their greater size.
Thus, the 0.3% score for lettuce (grown free of any artificial pesticides) signifies that a nor-
mal human daily consumption (estimated at 1/8 of a head), containing 66.3 milligrams of
caffeic acid, constitutes (by linear extrapolation) 0.3% of the daily lifetime dose that would
halve the number of tumor-free rodents by the end of a standard lifetime. See Lois Swirsky
Gold et al., Rodent Carcinogens: Setting Priorities, 258 SCIENCE 261-65 (1992). The 2.8%
figure for a daily 12-ounce bottle of beer, based on its 18 milliliters of ethyl alcohol, marks it
as 1400 times more potent than the 0.002% figure for a daily 6-ounce glass of apple juice,
based on the EPA's contentions about Alar, and 7000 times more potent than the 0.0004%
figure for ordinary pre-ban consumption of EDB. Id.
7. Breyer cites, for example, estimates that vaccinations against the leading cause of bac-
terial meningitis would cost only $68,000 per child's life saved. P. 19.
8. The theoretical rational optimum would occur when the health return per dollar for all
interventions was equal at the margin, that is, where no dollar of investment in health could
be shifted to a more productive use.
9. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (July 5,
1912), in HoLMEs-SHmEaA LEmrns: THE LE-rans OF JusrIcE Ou.vR WENDELL HoLMEs
AND CANON PATRICK Auous'm SHEE-HAN 45 (David H. Burton ed., 1976), quoted at p. 37.
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likely to reach inaccurate conclusions from a few stories associating
toxic waste dumps with cancer. With 26,000 waste dumps through-
out the country and a large number of locales with above-average
cancer rates (by definition roughly one half), the probability that
these two facts will coincide is overwhelming. A few dramatic coin-
cidences, though in fact meaningless, may create an impression of a
causal link.
Congress, meanwhile, adopts a range of mandates, from ex-
tremely detailed linguistic formulae, to absolute bans, to "ham-
mers" - statutes that allow the EPA some time to devise
regulatory control for some activity (for example, underground dis-
posal of a chemical), but ban the activity outright if the agency
misses the deadline. However these approaches might be recon-
ciled in theory, in operation they yield widely varying degrees of
stringency. The variations are hardly surprising. Congressional
bills originate at different times, in different committees, with each
subcommittee "competing for political time and attention" and thus
likely to "consider the particular problems that it has studied as the
most important, deserving a place at the head of the regulatory
queue, whether or not dispassionate observers would reach the
same conclusion" (p. 42). Although statutory language may offer
apparent flexibility, agency fear of congressional oversight may
limit its use: EPA officials may know that, "given an individual leg-
islator's political incentive to appear in interesting, positive news
stories, hearings are far more likely to mean criticism for leniency
than for strictness" (pp. 40-41).
Finally, the facts about environmental risks are most uncertain.
Agencies typically infer risk to humans by extrapolating from the
response of rats and mice exposed to very high doses. In doing so,
they assume a linear dose-response curve; that is, they assume that
if a dose of X causes cancer in fifty out of a hundred rodents, a dose
of X/1000 - adjusting for the difference in weights or body surface
area, to be sure - will cause cancer one thousandth as frequently,
or in fifty humans out of every one hundred thousand exposed. In
other words, the method infers human responses at low doses from
rodent responses at very high doses. But rats and mice differ from
humans in ways that appear relevant to the likelihood of carcinoge-
nicity (p. 46). Moreover, even if a linear dose-response curve were
accurate for the range of exposure relevant to humans (and it might
be accurate, depending on the etiology of the disease, which is typi-
cally little understood), doses at the levels used in experiments, the
highest that can be administered without killing the rodents from
sheer toxicity, appear quite different. Such doses kill large numbers




of cells at a time, and thus bring on quick cell regeneration and a
risk of cancer-causing mutations that is not present when cells are
killed more gradually.10 There is, Breyer observes, "no consistent
scientific rationale for assuming a linear relation between dose and
response" (p. 44).
Breyer's solution flows naturally from his analysis. He "as-
sume[s] a kind of 'general will' - a public that 'really' wants an
overall result that differs from its substance-specific preferences re-
vealed on particular occasions" (p. 55), and he treats the current
disarray as a problem of governmental coordination. Thus he pro-
poses a way for the executive branch to impose a coherent, rational
policy on its own sprawling provinces - to the extent that statutes
permit - and to present an intelligible program to Congress in the
hopes of persuading it to iron out the current statutory anomalies.
He would establish a small cadre of personnel within OMB,
charged with the mission of building a coherent system of risk regu-
lation and wielding authority to reallocate resources among the
concerned agencies (p. 60). Its members would enjoy civil service
protection (p. 61) and would proceed along a special career path
that might take them to specific agencies such as the EPA and the
FDA, or to a congressional committee staff (p. 71). The most suc-
cessful might go on to such positions as Science Advisor to the Pres-
ident or Director of OMB (p. 71). Breyer's explicit model is the
French Conseil d'Etat, a relatively small group of elite civil servants,
mostly drawn from the Ecole National d'Administration, with com-
petence both in law and in at least one substantive field, who bring
intellect and a more-or-less unified viewpoint to bear on the activi-
ties of the executive and legislative branches.
10. P. 46; see also Daniel E. Koshland Jr., Molecule of the Year: The DNA Repair En-
zyme, 266 ScmNcE 1925 (1994). Koshland argues that extrapolating cancer risk from high
dose rodent exposures is like evaluating fire risks in a large city by setting 1000 simultaneous
fires in a town of 5000. That the small town's fire department is completely overwhelmed
scarcely demonstrates that a large city's department will be defeated by a handful of fires. Id.
Says Koshland:
The estimated error rate for a DNA replication in the human with a well functioning
repair system is about 10"10 mutations per base pair per cell generation. This system
copes with a human who has 1011 cells with 4 X 101 bases per cell, who goes through 1016
division cycles in a normal life span.
Id. Thus, though the net error rate is very low - one in 10 billion - the number of events is
very large, so that the aggregate number of errors absorbed in a lifetime is very high. Expo-
sure to cell-damaging chemicals must be assessed in this context.
Affirmative evidence also demonstrates that chemicals having a statistical association
with increased tumors at high doses - relative to unexposed rodents - have a statistical
association with decreased tumors at moderate doses. Philip H. Abelson, Risk Assessments
of Low-Level Exposures, 265 ScIEcE 1507 (1994); see also A.M. Monro, Letter to the Edi-
tor, 266 ScIENCE 1141 (1994) (discussing the anticarcinogenetic and antimutagenetic effects
of chemicals); R.C. von Borstel, Letter to the Editor, id. at 1144 (same).
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Breyer's summary of the current workings of our risk regulatory
policy seems to me hard to improve upon, though experts doubtless
could add detail, nuance, and qualification on many issues. While
Breyer has been criticized for failure to offer a clearly preferable
alternative to the risk assessment methodologies currently in
place," one can imagine his implicit response: "That's my point.
Only if we improve the institutional structure can we expect better
methodologies." The force of such an answer, of course, depends
on a number of unknowns. If there is no more plausible method of
using rodent tests than the one employed under present science pol-
icy' 2 (linear extrapolation to humans from testing at high doses),
yet there is a strong political demand that government screen out
risks in advance of epidemiological evidence (in other words,
before mortality and disease occur), then even the best institutions
will not produce a remedy. Still, the criticism is a bit skewed; a
book on political economy need not solve conundrums of science
policy.' 3
As to the causes of the current predicament, Breyer is convinc-
ing that the ones he identifies play a serious role, and his proposed
remedy promises a step forward. Yet a shadowy figure sits at the
table, one whose workings Breyer hardly discusses but who may
nonetheless be critical: the interest group. Consider the Conseil
d'Etat Does France adhere to - indeed insist upon - the Euro-
pean Community's Common Agricultural Policy,14 with its butter
mountains and its wine lakes, because the policy analysts of the
Conseil have concluded that it represents the optimal policy for
France, or does it do so because the French farmers constitute a
powerful and effective lobby? If it is the latter, as I suspect, may
not similar groups account for the condition of our risk regula-
tion?15 If so, will not the solution require something a good deal
more dramatic than bolstering OMB? -
11. Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 449, 460 (1995) (saying Breyer
offers only "wishful thinking" as an alternative to the current system of risk assessment).
12. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PRoJEC, INC., CHoic-s rN RiSK ASSESSMENT.
Tm ROLE OF ScIENcE PoucY IN THm ENviRONmENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
(1994) (characterizing default assumptions that currently drive risk assessment as choices of
"science policy").
13. A possible approach might be a de miniris rule framed as follows: Refrain from
intervention at least where rodent tests applied under current default assumptions yield risks
so low that, assuming validity of the inference, even a lifetime of experience (say 70 years)
would yield no persuasive epidemiological evidence.
14. The Common Agricultural Policy is a complex system protecting higher-cost produ-
cers in the European Community from competition and yielding large surpluses of the goods
whose suppliers are protected. See e.g., Spudsidies, TiE ECONOMIsT, Apr. 10, 1993, at 17.
15. For an interesting case study, see ALAN I. MARCUS, CANCER FROM BEE. DES, FED-
ERAL FOOD REGULATION, AND CONSUMER CONFIDENCE (1994).
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Let us start with the most obvious culprits - the regulatees.
Media accounts of major environmental statutes or rules ordinarily
depict the regulated parties as ranged monolithically against the
lovers of clean air, land, and water. There is of course some truth to
the picture, as many regulatees would obviously prefer no regula-
tion to any, and light regulation to harsh. But the assumption of a
homogeneous "business" interest group is naive, even if we keep
our eyes solely on the regulatees. For example, restricting the pro-
duction of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the face of rising demand
may have given the existing CFC producers oligopoly profits,16 at
least until Congress imposed taxes to catch the profits.17 Moreover,
some have suggested that the Wisconsin and Minnesota legislatures
imposed temporary bans on the use or sale of bovine somatotropin
and bovine growth hormone' 8 to protect not consumers' health but
producers' wealth. Specifically, these moratoria would tend to pre-
vent large dairy farmers from enhancing their advantage over
smaller ones, and - less clearly - prevent Western and South-
western farmers from increasing their advantage over those in the
upper Midwest and the Northeast. 19
More generally, of course, regulatee interest appears to be a ma-
jor reason why Congress has never chosen pollution taxes as a regu-
latory device. Economists nearly unanimously believe that such
taxes would secure more environmental improvement per dollar
than the present command-and-control systems because pollution
cutbacks would occur primarily at firms for which cutbacks were
relatively cheap.20 Pollution taxes would, however, force firms to
pay not only for the units they remove, but also for the units they
continue to emit - units that are costless to them under conven-
tional command-and-control regulation. Thus pollution taxes ap-
pear to be political nonstarters, even disregarding the opposition of
environmental lobbies, which is discussed below.
The power of regulatee interests burgeons when combined with
sectional interests, and together they can radically impact the shape
16. See Daniel F. Mclnnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PoLrTcs: PUBLIc CosTs, PRIVATE REWARDs 129, 145-49 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L.
Smith Jr. eds., 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PoLmcs].
17. Id. at 150.
18. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 97.235 (West Supp. 1994) (repealed 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 151.25 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
19. See Christopher L. Culp, Sacred Cows: The Bovine Somatotropin Controversy, in EN.
VIRONMENTAL PoLITcs, supra note 16, at 47.
20. Expressed more technically, all firms would reduce poliution to the point at which the
marginal cost of reduction equalled the unit tax. As the marginal cost would be equal across
firms, there would be no reallocations of cutback that could achieve the same aggregate re-
duction at lower cost.
[Vol. 93:1498
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of regulation. For example, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 21
in effect requiring "partial scrubbing" to reduce sulfur dioxide emis-
sions, both protected the market for high-sulfur Midwestern coal
and imposed lower unit costs on electricity produced in the region
than those imposed on the less-politically-represented Sunbelt.22
The prevention-of-significant-deterioration (PSD) rules that Con-
gress adopted the same year also tended to protect the Rustbelt
against Sunbelt competition. As Robert Crandall - among others
- argues, it seems a mistake to attribute the PSD rules to a simple
devotion to clean air: the congressional support came largely from
the North and Northeast, and the rules took the form of a quite
unnecessarily byzantine permit process in the PSD regions.23 Re-
gional favoritism also appears pervasively in the tendency to im-
pose more stringent standards on new sources. 24 Other political
and economic factors are at work, of course - such as the natural
political advantage of existing firms and employers over ones as yet
unborn, and, to a degree, the interest in efficiency, as pollution con-
trol is almost always more costly as a retrofit than in initial con-
struction = but the sectional influence can hardly be disregarded.25
Regulatees are not the only commercial interests trying to influ-
ence regulatory policy. Every cost incurred in cutting pollution,
even if it goes only to reduce Breyer's "last ten per cent," is revenue
for someone else, namely, the suppliers of the land, labor, and
equipment needed to effect the reduction. Unsurprisingly - and,
of course, legitimately - the firms involved lobby aggressively for
pollution controls that will send lucrative business their way.26 For
example, agricultural and petroleum interests have been quite vocal
in the highly charged debate over the use of cleaner-burning "oxy-
genates" in reformulated gasoline, a multi-million-dollar market,
with farmers pushing corn-derived ethanol and petroleum interests
21. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOM-
ICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN Am 123-25 (1983). Because the scrubbing requirement applied
to new sources, its impact was most severe in rapidly growing areas and mildest in the slow-
growth areas - which happened also to produce high-sulphur coal. See generally BRUCE A.
AcRmuMAN & WiLLiAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY Am (1981).
23. CRANDALL, supra note 22, at 127-29.
24. ld. at 39-44.
25. The bias against new sources may also fit the agenda of persons in the environmental
movement who are concerned more with reducing industrial development than pollution it-
self. Cf. BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLrICAL LmTrrs OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 159-60
(1989) (taking note of the distinction between pure environmentalists and the antigrowth or
antibusiness lobby that "parades under the bannerof environmentalism").
26. See, eg., Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests
and Superfund, in ENVmONMENTAL POLITIcs, supra note 16, at 67.
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boosting natural-gas-derived MTBE. 27 The presence of revenues
for firms that supply pollution control and remediation does not
mean that their political clout exactly balances that of the regu-
latees; the former companies may be starting up, as yet unable to
match large existing pollution sources. They nevertheless stand as a
counterweight and a force affecting both the stringency and the de-
sign of regulation.
Even among the environmentalists themselves, the very
problems that make it desirable to have environmental groups -
problems of transaction costs and rational consumer ignorance -
suggest a question about their representative capacity. People as
consumers and enjoyers of the environment have relatively insub-
stantial interests in the characteristics of innumerable consumer
goods and potential threats to the environment; each person is
likely to be unwilling to invest time and effort in becoming in-
formed, lobbying, or negotiating with offending firms. Thus stan-
dard public choice lore suggests that parties with more
concentrated interests, such as industry or labor groups, will be
more effective than scattered environmentalists in applying pres-
sure to legislatures or agencies.2 National and regional environ-
mental groups appear to represent a partial solution: they can
somewhat offset this apparent lopsidedness, aggregating the small
contributions of many members to advance their views.
The assumption as to the members' rational ignorance of the
details of each dispute nonetheless cuts deeper. This ignorance im-
plies that the members have a limited ability to monitor the organi-
zation's leadership and staff. Consequently, the leadership may
"shirk" a bit, that is, pursue to a degree their own rather than the
members' interests.29 The fact that the members continue to con-
27. The EPA adopted a requirement that reformulated gasoline be made in such a way as
to give "renewable oxygenates" (in practice, ethanol) a "30% market share," on the theory
that ethanol would have attained such a share but for certain adverse effects from its use in
summer months. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Oxygenate Re-
quirement for Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,258, 39,262 (1994). The rule was va-
cated in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 94-1502, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28,1995).
28. For a discussion of the advantages that small groups in general have in organizing and
thus obtaining public goods, see MANcUR OLSON, Tim LooIC oF CoL VEcvn AcMON 48,
53-57 (1971). For a discussion of the same advantages enjoyed by certain special interests
such as industry and labor groups, see id. at 143-48.
29. The problem is obviously not unique to environmental organizations but would apply
to any similarly structured association with a very large number of members who individually
have relatively small interests. See generally Robert Michels, Oligarchy, in The Sociology of
Organizations 25-43 (Oscar Grusky & George A. Miller, eds., 1970) (stating what has be-
come known as "Michels's iron law of oligarchy"). Publicly held corporations potentially
present the same problem. But the market for corporate control, by which outsiders who
perceive the possibility of a more lucrative use of the corporate assets can express their judg-
ment in a form that can be tested in the market - for example, a bid with a higher dollar
value than the current market value of the stock - constrains the risk of shirking in the
corporate context. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (discussing the
[Vol. 93:1498
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tribute does not disprove this theory; the same rational ignorance
that gives rise to the initial problem limits the meaning of this ap-
parent ratification by donation.
What form might shirking by environmental groups take? Har-
ris and Milkis suggest one possibility: the reluctance to settle dis-
putes, on the ground that settlement has little dramatic appeal and
thus weakens fundraising. They quote a public interest lawyer:
Environmental groups thrive on conflict. It's a standard joke that the
basic environmental groups['] fundraising letter begins, "Babies will
die if you turn the page [and don't contribute]." The impact would be
very different to say, "If you don't open this envelope, we won't be
able to open negotiations with the other side."30
They even quote one environmental activist for the observation
that legislative victories may be a setback to fundraising, again be-
cause they undermine the sense of urgency.31 The surge in contri-
butions triggered by Reagan's appointment of James Watt as
Secretary of the Interior suggests the advantages of an atmosphere
of menace. Another - perhaps in part contradictory - theory of
possible shirking is Michael Greve's argument that citizen enforce-
ment suits against noncomplying private parties have a low return
in environmental enhancement but a high one in pecuniary payoff
for national organizations, especially when they are settled with a
so-called mitigation or credit paid to the suing organization.32
Either tendency might tend to thwart the efforts of Breyer's
experts.
A further impediment to effective regulation is that the environ-
mental group's leadership and staff may benefit more from
command-and-control approaches to regulation than pollution
taxes or marketable pollution rights. Suppose that market-mimick-
ing methods of pollution regulation are more likely to lead to a
stable regulatory equilibrium than command-and-control methods.
Such a result may occur because under such methods, polluters
would have market incentives to search for and to deploy pollution-
reducing technology, just as they search for and deploy other tech-
Court's endorsement of the role of the market for corporate control). In addition to the
problem of shirking, members of nonprofit associations are unlikely to agree on any readily
measurable criterion of success.
30. RicHARD A. HAius & SmEY M. Mms, TE PoLtrrcs OF REGULATORY CHANGE
305 (1989). According to Keith Schneider, "[A] recent fund-raising mailing from the Na-
tional Audubon Society said the group could 'project with some accuracy the eventual end of
the natural world as we know it.' 'That is no trees,' the letter said. 'No wildlife.'" Keith
Schneider, Big Environment Hits a Recession, N.Y. TuMEs, Jan. 1, 1995, § 3, at 4.
31. HAgms & MILKas, supra note 30, at 305.
32. Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcemen; Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen
Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLrrcs, supra note 16, at 105-
27. Greve's theory may nonetheless be reconciled with Harris and Milkis's by imagining an
optimal litigation portfolio, consisting of advantageous pecuniary settlements spiced with
some dramatic nonpecuniary wins and losses.
May 1995] 1507
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nologies that improve products or reduce costs, so that environmen-
tal quality would steadily - and "naturally" - grow, like other
parts of the economy. By contrast command-and-control methods
tend to create a market for the activities in which the leadership
and staff have a comparative advantage - litigation and the lobby-
ing of Congress and the agencies. Further, both litigation and lob-
bying, though typically not lucrative for environmental staff,
provide the excitement of participating in high-level policymaking
and agenda-setting. 33
To the extent that the possible divergence between the leader-
ship and members of interest groups poses a problem, the press
seems not to exercise a corrective influence. The media problem is
implicit in Breyer's observation, noted above, that legislators, eager
to appear in interesting and positive news stories, are far more
likely to engage in criticisms of EPA officials for leniency than for
strictness (pp. 40-41). Viewed again from a simple interest-group
perspective, this observation is hardly surprising. Would newscasts
revealing that alar is probably not a cause of cancer attract many
viewers? Risk sells.34
Bruce Yandle compares the interest groups in the environmen-
tal arena with the bootleggers-Baptist alliance on alcohol.3 5 The
bootleggers not only add political heft to the Baptists' regulatory
impulses, but their presence in the winning coalition shapes the re-
sulting regulation. Yandle notes that liquor laws normally do not
restrict the consumption or the possession of liquor in general - as
one might expect if the goal were solely to reduce consumption -
but rather, its sale on Sundays or during late hours.3 6 The former
strategy of general restriction would yield no special advantage to
bootleggers. Yandle summarizes the all-round satisfying nature of
Sunday liquor restrictions:
33. See, eg., JEREMY RAtIUN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PuBLIc LAW DISTORTS
PUBUiC PoLicY (1989) (arguing that public interest groups are able by their litigation strate-
gies to determine, or at least radically affect, agencies' regulatory agendas). According to the
current head of EPA, Carol Browner, "The litigation is essentially setting the priorities."
WALL ST. J., May 24, 1993, at B1, B6.
Further, being a "player" in washington may help raise funds from sources that members
might regard as contaminated. See MARK DowiE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF rmE TwENTmm CEmTRY 113-14 (1995) (reporting that the
head of the National Wildlife Federation attended a breakfast meeting between the head of
the EPA and the chief executive officer of a large toxic waste disposal company that contrib-
uted generously to the Federation, one of the breakfast topics being regulatory relief for the
firm) reviewed by Keith Schneider, Back to the Grass Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, § 7
(Book Review), at 15.
34. Cf MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 122 (1982) (arguing that in cer-
tain subcultures sects compete for adherents by depicting the outside world as dangerous and
impure).
35. YANDLE, supra note 25, at 23.
36. Id. at 24.
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Interestingly, regulations of the Sunday sale of booze tie together
bootleggers, Baptists, and the legal operators of liquor stores. The
bootleggers buy from the legal outlets on Saturday, sell at higher
prices on Sunday, and the Baptists praise the effort to enforce the
regulatory cartel. Meanwhile, the political suppliers of the regulation
reap the support of all the groups, and the Internal Revenue Service
works to prevent market entry by those who would produce alcoholic
beverages on homemade stills. 7
Of course to observe a theoretical basis for a divergence be-
tween interest group elites and their members, or for interest-group
distortions of environmental policy, is not to prove their existence
or significant impact.. On that issue we lack firm data. In thinking
about whether the issue deserves investigation, however, one must
realize that there is a serious question whether the federalization of
environmental regulation since 1970 has yielded significant environ-
mental benefits. The data for the periods both before and after that
benchmark are spotty and questionable on a number of grounds.38
Nonetheless, although they show pollution declining after 1970, the
rate of decline in important areas such as ambient levels of carbon
monoxide and sulphur dioxide is slower than in the 1960s. Crandall
concludes that "these data suggest that pollution reduction was
more effective in the 1960s, before there was a serious federal pol-
icy dealing with stationary sources, than since the 1970 Clean Air
Act Amendments, ' 39 Of course, the rate of improvement may
have slowed simply because increments of cleanup get more and
more expensive as progress is made - Breyer's "last ten per cent"
point again. Still, without affirmative evidence that federal involve-
ment has yielded real improvement - compared to the preexisting
trend line - it certainly seems worthwhile to study whether inter-
est group activities are skewing the whole project. If they are, then
merely enhancing the skill and authority of OMB mandarins seems
woefully inadequate.
After all, in a process that Breyer carefully notes, presidents
since Nixon have struggled to coordinate and rationalize executive
regulatory activities (pp. 68-71). Indeed, Breyer sees OMB's Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a prime instrument of that
effort, as a starting point for his reform (p. 72). These presidential
activities are intuitively plausible: if any elected official has a polit-
ical incentive to consider the interest of the nation as a whole, it
should be the president, whose luster depends, more than others,
on the condition of the economy as a whole. Yet despite years of
presidential initiative, we are where we are. Although it is hard to
37. Id. at 25.
38. See CRANDALL, supra note 22, at 16-31.
39. Id. at 19.
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quarrel with the idea of trying to shore up OIRA with more person-
nel, more scientific skill, and a broader mandate, those increments
seem modest. If an important reason for its limited success has
been the ability of line agencies to mobilize their interest groups in
support of their actions, as some observers suggest,40 the reformers
seem likely to be outgunned.
If interest group distortions are indeed serious, what measures
might work? Possibly none. The only recent models for successful
challenge to interest groups seem to be the 1986 tax reform and the
use of commissions to recommend the closure of obsolete military
bases, many bases at a time. The unifying principle behind the two
is that clipping the special privileges of many interest groups in a
single cut may yield a large enough increase in social surplus to
attract media attention and political support.41 This action at least
has the capability of producing adequate rewards for political entre-
preneurs - the only people who mobilize the sort of broad coali-
tion necessary for radical change in the status quo. Breyer's
analysis surely can illuminate - but his remedy cannot supplant -
the necessary political battles.
40. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Gno.
WAsH. L. REv. 533, 560 & n.151 (1989).
41. Cf Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1729-32 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (recog-
nizing that the political feasibility of the congressionally established base-closing project de-
pended on its all-or-nothing character).
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